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Abstract 
 
We suggest that the pragmatist theory of public interest has implications for the 
contraposition between self-regarding and other-regarding preferences in economics. We re-
consider this distinction and replace some of the existing categories with the idea of inclusive 
and exclusive social preferences over both organizational and strategic decision-making 
domains. The value is in the idea of both exclusive and inclusive preferences being social in 
nature and in the application both to the internal organization and its impacts on people 
outside. Our framework explains governance heterogeneity by contrasting exclusive and 
inclusive social preferences in cooperatives, social enterprises, as well as traditional 
corporations. A discussion of the evolution of social preferences is addressed through 
examples and regional experiences. We argue that the social preferences perspective 
contributes to understand the cause of strategic failure in the development of localities and 
regions.   
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 “We may desire abolition of war, industrial justice, greater equality 
of opportunity for all. But no amount of preaching good will or the 
golden rule of cultivation of sentiments of love and equity will 
accomplish the results. There must be change in objective 
arrangements and institutions. We must work on the environment 
not merely on the hearts of men. To think otherwise is to suppose 
that flowers can be raised in a desert or motor cars run in a jungle. 
Both things can happen and without a miracle. But only by first 
changing the jungle and desert.”  
     (Dewey, 1922, p. 27) 
1. Introduction 
 
Like other critical approaches to an exclusive globalisation process centred around the aims, 
choices and modalities of conventional equity-based corporation, this paper starts from a 
recognition of the public failures associated with the dominant way of organising production 
(Cowling and Sugden, 1994, 1998a, 1998b). We wish to problematize such failures by 
offering an analytical perspective that unbundles the relationship between strategic choices in 
production and the public sphere, and argue that by recapturing the spirit of 
interconnectedness between strategic decisions, their contextual conditions and consequences 
we can identify the potential of different forms of production governance to meet societal 
needs.  
The interconnections between private actions and public impacts have been profusely 
explored in economic analysis. However, analytically, the private and the public (or social) 
dimensions of individual action have been traditionally kept separate. In On Liberty, Mill 
seeks the philosophical basis for protecting individuality from the authority of society. The 
latter, for Mill, identifies the meaning of “public.” 
The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due 
consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of 
their constituted rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion, 
though not by law. As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects 
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prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the 
question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by 
interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for 
entertaining any such question when a person's conduct affects the interests 
of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all 
the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of 
understanding). In all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal and 
social, to do the action and stand the consequences (Mill, 1859/1869, Ch. IV, 
our emphasis). 
Consistently, in their conceptualisation, preferences are typically divided in two categories: 
the self-regarding and the other-regarding, where the first are contextualised in a purely 
private domain, whilst the second denote individual dispositions towards others or towards 
society at large. Stakeholder management or policies correcting for market failures, 
consistently, would emphasise the support of “socially valued outcomes … by harnessing 
selfish motives to socially valued ends…” (Gintis et al. 2005, p. 4),1 such as when connecting 
pollution control or workplace safety to productivity or absence of penalties. On the other 
hand, experimental results suggest that individuals do not, in many instances, behave as self-
seeking agents, but rather express other-regarding preferences when faced with a choice (ben-
Ner and Putterman, 1998).  
In line with earlier pragmatists and institutionalists, we suggest that the separation between 
the private dimension and the sphere of others can lead to a misinterpretation of the context 
and consequences of what is commonly understood as a “private” choice (Dewey, 1927; 
Clark, 1926; Kapp, 1963). Differently, we want to emphasise the interaction between 
behaviours and their context, embedding the public dimension into the economic 
conceptualisation of private choices. The public dimension, in the interpretation of this paper, 
                                                 
1
 Gintis continues saying “Effective policies are those that support socially valued outcomes not only by 
harnessing selfish motives to socially valued ends, but also by evoking, cultivating, and empowering 
public-spirited motives” (Gintis et al. 2005, p. 4). 
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is not the arena of governmental policies,2 as in Stigler (1971) and Posner (1974), or central 
planning, as in Hayek (1944). Rather we consider the public dimension as 1) the objective 
environment represented by social institutions which affect the formation of particular 
tendencies in the way individuals act (prior to action); 2) the known and unknown variable 
wave of influences that radiates from each individual choice (following action). What we aim 
at stressing more explicitly in comparison with established theories is that preferences and 
related choices are not, by their very nature, purely private, not least in their antecedents and 
consequences. Rather, following Dewey (1922, 1927), we openly recognise that, not some, 
but each private choice must include a public dimension:3 
“Breathing is an affair of the air as truly as of the lungs; digesting an affair of 
food as truly as of tissues of stomach … There are specific good reasons for the 
usual attribution of acts to the person they immediately proceed. But to convert 
this special reference into a belief of exclusive ownership is as misleading as to 
suppose that breathing and digesting are complete within the human body.” 
(Dewey, 1922, p. 24). 
 
Infusing our interpretation of the pragmatist and early institutional spirit, we consider 
decision-making in particular, as a composite function of the objective environment in which 
decisions are taken in the first place, of the subjective dispositions and habits of thought that 
underpin decisions, as well as of the consequences of related actions (Dewey, 1922; Veblen, 
1898). It follows that particular patterns in strategic choice are not to be attributed solely to 
the subjective dispositions of decision-makers, but also to an objective component defined by 
social customs, pecuniary institutions (such as the “profit-seeking enterprise”, the price 
system, profit-seeking behaviour), business regulation, production technologies, and to the 
                                                 
2
 According to standard views in economics, the State is viewed as acting for the public interests against market 
failures or, as the Chicago school suggests, as the maker of regulatory policies which are nonetheless 
captured by specific industries for their own private interest. These perspectives and debate are 
reviewed by Chang (1997).  
3
 In Sandel’s view, the temptation to decontextualize choice from its context has seduced Rawls (1971) who, 
whilst seeking a construct for achieving just choices, had to cut bridges with individual identity and 
experience (Sandel, 1982; Quinn et al. 1997). This is however a problematic argument that would 
deserve a wider debate. In Rawl’s defence, the pre-commitment to the creation of an unbiased 
normative framework can be considered as a necessary condition for the development of the type of 
democratic interaction envisaged for example in the pragmatist approach.  
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pre-existing experience of each individual interacting with them (Atkins et al. 1931; Mitchell, 
1924).  
We convey Dewey’s emphasis on the interconnectedness of individuals and their context by 
considering: the nature of decision-makers’ dispositions towards others; whether there are 
tendencies in such dispositions that would prevail under different socio-economic 
institutions; the features of the socio-economic conditions in which particular tendencies in 
production organisations develop or perish. In practice, we observe how in different 
situations the choice of production aims and processes embed, at their heart, the methods for 
critically evaluating the contextual conditions and impacts of strategic choice.  
The paper proceeds by overcoming the partition between self-regarding (private) and other-
regarding (social) preferences, and considers instead that all preferences are social, whether 
inclusive or exclusive of the effects on others and society. We then argue that in the current 
economic environment, strategic choices do not reflect, as a norm, inclusive social 
preferences, therefore preventing production choices to achieve collectively beneficial ends. 
Following these considerations we present a framework to discriminate amongst business 
types and provide possible explanations for the emergence and persistence of exclusive rather 
than inclusive forms of production organisation. In particular, we reason on what elements 
can be expected to lead to the development of more (or less) inclusive social preferences 
amongst business decision makers, reinforcing, in our conclusions, the role of individual 
dispositions as well as the meaningfulness of institutions and policy action in supporting and 
empowering the expression of inclusive social preferences. Specific examples are used to 
exemplify our arguments. 
 
2. Inclusive and exclusive social preferences 
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To explain the ambiguities that can originate when overlooking the interconnections between 
individual action, socio-economic institutions, and public impacts consider the 
conceptualisation put forward in Ben-Ner and Putterman (1998):  
“Self-regarding preferences concern the individual’s own consumption and other 
outcomes, other-regarding preferences concern the consumption and outcomes of 
others, and process-regarding preferences concern the manner in which the 
individual in question and others behave, including the ways in which they attain 
outcomes of interest. We shall refer to process-regarding preferences mainly as 
values, but sometimes also as codes of behaviour, mores, ethics, and by other 
terms, depending mostly on the context”  (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998, p. 7) 
 
In this view procedural preferences provide the contextual dimension, defined by the shared 
values underpinning the choice of means, whilst self- and other-regarding preferences entail 
the subjective dimension, that is how individuals regard their own choices and the choices of 
others. Our perspective may help to comprehend how, by separating the objective and the 
subjective world, by keeping procedural preferences separate from self- and other-regarding 
preferences, treated in turn as separate entities, the three categories overlap at a number of 
cross-roads. As private actions have public bearings, it follows that also self-regarding 
preferences underpinning private actions have a public impact: they regard others. Other-
regarding preferences may, in some respects, overlap with self-interest when, as utilitarians 
would put it, this maximises one’s utility, for example, drawing from a desire for self-esteem 
or, more crudely, from a self-centred assessment of what can ensure survival in the long-run. 
Process-regarding preferences represent the choice of means towards the end; and means, 
besides ends, can be defined as self- or other-regarding. By providing the context in which 
humans interact, socially accepted processes are, moreover, means which can in turn impact 
on the formation of self- or other-regarding dispositions.  
In order to avoid the ambiguity surrounding the interaction between the individual and the 
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public sphere, we suggest in the first place overcoming the distinction between self- and 
other-regarding preferences, purely individual and social preferences. If we do so, the first 
problem for the decision-maker becomes of understanding the possible consequences of one’s 
actions. Besides the impacts of choices on society at large, Dewey talks about the existence 
of a plurality of “publics” rather than “the public” as a monolithic entity (Long, 1990). In this 
sense we can say that specific publics are generated by each action. It also follows that each 
socio-economic actor is part of one or more publics (Dewey, 1927). An appreciation of 
consequences, therefore, comes from the discovery of publics. What this requires is a 
disposition towards enquiry at the subjective level, as well as supporting and enabling 
institutions at an objective level (ibid.).  
We follow the pragmatist interpretation of action, and build a perspective on the dispositions 
of decision-makers towards two dimensions: cognition and inclusion. The cognitive element 
signals the decision-maker’s attitude towards enquiry, his/her desire to uncover false believes 
and create new ones. This is a disposition towards discovery and use of critical thought, 
which is not the same as saying that human cognition does not have limitations. Rather, the 
opposite is true: enquiry requires recognition of human cognitive limitations, from which the 
relevance of reflecting on experience, using critical thinking and deliberation. Such a process 
involves the constant appraisal of initial ends and actions as we interact with others and with 
the context more broadly. Learning about what we find acceptable must be an inter-subjective 
experience.  
Complementary, the inclusion element pertains to the means or processes through which 
actors pursue enquiry and inform their choices. Actors can pursue knowledge either by 
processes that are exclusive or alternatively inclusive. In the first case actors adopt a 
“presentist” or “libertarian” approach, as Offe (2011) calls it, by which the individual actor is 
at the centre of the strategic decision-making process, regardless or despite the interests of 
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others, including future generations (Cf. Zeitlin, 1974; Cowling and Sugden, 1994). 
Alternatively, actors can account for the known impacts of their own choices on self and 
others, whilst seeking to improve understanding, mostly by sharing knowledge, experiences 
and decision-making power (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2009; Sacconi, 2011).  
Both dispositions, the exclusive and the inclusive, carry implications (more or less 
significant, more or less acknowledged) that reach beyond the individual sphere. The first 
disposition stresses the individualist or elitist dimension of decision-making, detaching the 
process (but not the outcomes) of decision-making from its wider consequences. The second 
pursues enquiry and choice by means of inclusion. It follows that both the exclusive and 
inclusive preferences are, in different ways, public and social in their nature. For the first, the 
public and social dimensions are defined solely by their consequences, whilst for the second 
they are inherent features of both consequences and process. To clarify we would say that the 
exclusive disposition encompasses the public dimension to the extent that it marginalises the 
interests of the publics affected (others) or the interests of society at large (the common 
good), therefore placing the needs of the excluded in jeopardy.  
Reflecting on the nature of free trade, Cowling and Sugden (1998a: 349) have referred to this 
phenomenon as strategic failure or “the failure of an economy’s system or process of 
strategic decision-making to yield the most appropriate outcomes for the society served by 
that economy” due to strategic decisions in production being concentrated in corporate 
hierarchies and made by a restricted group of managers or stockholders. Differently, true 
enquiry requires a cooperative and democratic discovery process, which finds at its heart the 
constant and critical appraisal of means, ends and consequences. It follows that actions based 
on the inclusive disposition reach beyond the individual actor’s sphere: not only because they 
impact on others and society at large (thus affecting others’ ‘negative freedom’), but also by 
means of engagement, shared decision-making and learning (the ‘positive freedom’ aspect) 
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(Berlin 1958; Joas, 1996).  
3. The problem of false believes and the need for deliberation  
 
From a pragmatist perspective, the desirability of production processes that favour enquiry 
and involvement is justifiable on the basis that exclusive allocation of decision-making power 
can undermine enquiry and perpetuate ‘false believes’ about conditions and consequences on 
the one hand, whilst causing strategic failure on the other.  The first reason is of philosophical 
nature, whilst the second builds on the strategic and operational aims of firms. Our argument 
is that the more strategic decision-making and responsibilities in production are shared and 
enquiry is pursued a) the more society eradicates false believes around the aims and 
modalities of production, and b) the lower is strategic failure.  
As an illustration of the argument, consider the widespread attacks to shipments of Somali 
pirates started in the Nineties. Piracy has clearly increased costs for the global shipping 
industry, whilst impacting on the economic and social development of communities in 
Somalia. An enquiry, however, on what triggered the initial metamorphosis of fishermen into 
out-of-laws would uncover issues which have roots in the way business has exclusively 
decided on the use of the Somali sea and costs, as well as the institutional and political 
vacuum in which the country lays (Lehr, 2006; AEDI, 2009). The Somali example, besides, 
suggests that exclusive social preferences, over time, misallocate resources, eroding 
efficiency by adding additional costs to businesses (e.g. for transport, insurance, private 
security) in the attempt to protect ships, people, and commodities from pirate hijacking. At 
the same time, piracy impacts on the development of economic activities within communities, 
crowding out initiative by distributing money from ransoms, as well as by jeopardising the 
delivery of food aids to the country. The initial choices of fishing companies to exploit the 
institutional vacuum by overexploiting fishing, or the choices of those countries that later on 
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dumped toxic wastes into the sea, explicitly disregarded the interests of costal Somali 
communities exacerbating strategic failure. These choices were the expression of the 
interaction between objective institutional conditions and the subjective personal dispositions 
of decision makers (which eventually have been turned also against the decision makers). 
The problem of false believes has been a favourite theme in the pragmatist philosophy of 
science. Peirce and later Dewey, in particular, emphasised that scientific enquiry has at its 
core the liberal tradition of questioning false believes and the creation of new ones. But 
because false believes can jeopardise the development of a variety of other aspects of human 
life, Dewy also argued that the need for enquiry should have not be confined to the scientific 
domain, but be extended to other fields of society by means of deliberative inter-subjective 
processes of learning (Dewey, 1927; Kelly, 1955; Earl, 1983).  
The deliberative method entails open communication among individuals based on the quality 
of arguments rather than on power or information asymmetries. Understanding and learning 
are therefore the result of an inter-subjective process, i.e. they depend on the publics involved 
and on the historically and culturally situated circumstances with which decision-makers 
interact. It follows that the efficacy of deliberation must be monitored and assessed by virtue 
of the extent to which diverse and potentially conflicting interests are accommodated and 
strategic failure is minimized over time. We can reasonably associate the odds of achieving 
such outcomes with objective contextual conditions, defining the possibility for publics to 
access and make sense of the decision-making processes, as well as with the habits and 
disposition of individuals to imagine the consequences of different patterns of action, 
exchange views and knowledge, learn and achieve a shared decision, despite diversities. 
Albeit the case for deliberation can be argued on the ground of the desirability of enquiry, the 
pre-conditions for effective deliberation are very demanding, as it would require the creation 
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of an enquiry habit, or a pattern in the way individuals tackle decision-making by exercising 
critical thinking, creative intelligence and imagination (Dewey, 1917; Taylor, 1989; McVea, 
2006; Sacchetti et al. 2009). The emergence of such tendencies requires the existence of 
factors (such as specific skills, even distribution of decision-making rights, knowledge 
sharing, trust and reciprocity amongst actors) that permit understanding, awareness, access 
and meaningful participation in deliberative processes (Dewey, 1922; Habermas, 1996; 
Sacchetti and Tortia, 2013). These conditions clearly exceed the nature of individual 
dispositions to include the creation of an institutional framework that enables consistent 
governance models, different from the one promoted by conventional corporate hierarchies 
(Quinn et al., 1997). At the same time, the decision-making process must maintain resilience 
to the intensification of complexity brought about by deliberation, specifically by identifying 
governance structures and practices that can make inclusion meaningful and sustainable, such 
as those based on stakeholder membership and democratic management of resources (Ostrom 
and Basurto, 2011).  
Note that the consolidation of enquiry-led inclusive behaviors is not against the functioning 
of markets. Nonetheless, market institutions, like other objective conditions, can change as an 
outcome of such dispositions. We must not think, however, that a change in market 
institutions, albeit possible, shall be always viable. In most cases it shall not, as for objective 
conditions to change a “crisis of experience” would have to be acknowledged and acted upon 
across different levels of society (Dewey, 1922:37; Nelson, 1994; David, 1985).  
 
4. Corporate hierarchy and strategic failure: widening the consideration of contexts and 
consequences 
Such crisis, apparently, has yet to come. Mostly we would argue, because only a portion of 
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the consequences of production organisation are measured (e.g. productivity and 
competitiveness) and because the appropriate conditions for deliberation are lacking in 
conventional hierarchical corporations.  
The reality of production governance and strategic decision-making, differently from the 
deliberative ideal, is based on explanations centred on the exploitation of power differentials. 
In other words, because relations are unequal, there is no spirit of enquiry inside corporate 
hierarchies (e.g. in the relation between superiors and subordinates) or in the governance of 
inter-firm production relations (Erdal, 2011; Marglin, 1974; Quinn et al. 1997; Sacchetti and 
Sugden, 2003). Rather, decision-making is understood in terms of a negotiation among self-
interested actors who will exploit power and information asymmetries, even at the detriment 
of others (Coase, 1960). To illustrate, consider the transaction cost approach and the strategic 
choice approach to the theory of the firm. 
Transaction cost economics has explained organisational structures in terms of their 
efficiency in reducing asymmetries that leads to opportunistic behaviour and moral hazard 
(Williamson, 1985). Transaction cost theory, in these respects, sees firms as instruments 
operated for the reduction of such asymmetries and the pursuit of economic efficiency. In 
doing so, it typically interprets extensive inclusion in deliberation processes as leading to a 
rise in transaction costs and, therefore, as detrimental to economic efficiency and 
competitiveness. 
From a different angle, theories of strategic failure and uneven development see conventional 
corporate organisations as mechanisms aimed at the exploitation of asymmetries. As Cowling 
and Sugden (1994) have explained, by concentrating control, decision makers can shape 
strategic choice (for example, on investments, employment and output) according to their 
own private interests, with no guarantee that such interests will correspond to what society 
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deems as desirable (Cowling and Sugden, 1994; Cowling and Sugden, 1998a; Cowling and 
Tomlinson, 2000). The consequence, as Hymer argued, is that the concentration of control 
over production decisions within the elites of corporate hierarchies has the power to promote 
inequality of ‘income, status and authority’ across regions and people (Hymer, 1972). This 
particular critique of globalization shares a concern for the fact that production choices have 
become increasingly a prerogative of restricted elites, mostly sitting in large transnational 
corporations. Authors have argued that the current situation compromises the principles of 
self-determination of communities and democracy, whilst perpetuating uneven development 
and strategic failure (Hymer 1972; Cowling and Sugden 1998a; Cowling and Tomlinson, 
2000; Sacchetti, 2004; Sugden and Wilson, 2002).  
 
Albeit from diverse perspectives, the transaction cost approach and the strategic failure 
approach offer two relevant focal points for interpreting the multifaceted socio-economic 
consequences of production organisation. We could say that transaction cost theory reflects, 
at operational levels, the organisational attempt to reduce the exploitation of information 
asymmetries and other moral hazards which undermine economic efficiency. To make sense 
of the wider socio-economic impacts, however, we need to see this type of economic 
efficiency as nested within the overarching strategic aim that, as strategic failure theorists 
argue, animates the fundamental governance choices of conventional corporations. Such aim 
would be the concentration of strategic decision-making power for the pursuit of particular 
interests.  
Against the 1950s view that presented conventional equity-based companies as entities that 
look after the public interest (Cf. Ireland, 2010 and Wade, 2009 for a criticism), exclusive 
governance indicates that, despite the intent of achieving internal cost minimisation, we can 
expect strategic decision-making to omit a multiplicity of relevant views and interests, thus 
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fostering the perpetuation of false believes regarding the needs of society (such as the that 
production must be organised by means of conventional corporate hierarchies) and eventually 
decreasing organisational efficiency besides failing to account for wider social objectives and 
interests.4  Moreover, even if debate was extended to include a variety of interests and views, 
because of the concentrated nature of conventional corporate governance and the profit-
making objective, there is no guarantee, as a norm, that decisions will, systematically and 
consistently, take into account the wider interests of society and publics, as in situations when 
social responsible practices are applied to some strategic aspects, but not to others which are 
more hidden to the public opinion.  
5. A taxonomy of production organisations 
Because of the inherent public and social dimension of every individual decision, we are 
raising a question on how decision-making in production can move towards an understanding 
of impacts beyond those currently regarded by conventional corporate hierarchies.  
We have focused in particular on the need to acquire the habit of enquiry and inclusion, 
which are, tendentially, not pivotal in conventional governance settings. Rather, following the 
strategic failure approach, corporate hierarchies are structured, as a norm, by a concentration 
of strategic decision-making power which leads to the exclusion of publics and broader social 
interests, thus limiting the potential of deliberation and enquiry. The implication for societies 
is one of strategic failure, exclusion of the interests of publics, and perpetuation of false 
believes.  
The above shortcomings provide reasons to support the desirability of a production system 
that places enquiry and inclusion as working rules, both at strategic and operational levels. 
                                                 
4
 In addition to the failures associated with concentrated decision-making power, the shortcomings of limited 
liability of shareholders in conventional equity-based corporations have recently attracted further 
attention. See the special issues on corporate liability and on the global financial crisis appeared on 
Cambridge Journal of Economics in 2010 and 2009 respectively. 
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This is consistent with production being organised around inclusive social dispositions, a 
principle that does not disregard efficiency, but nonetheless re-positions it at an operational 
level, rather than at a strategic one. Our aim now is to use these ideas to identify a specific 
framework which can support an assessment of social preferences in firms and production 
systems.  
There are two aspects of production choices, specifically, that are taken into account here: 
governance choices and other strategic choices. The first is the mother of all strategic 
choices; it defines the nature of the firm, its ownership and formal structure. At this level, 
governance provides a view on the aim and formal rules for decision-making. For example 
investor-owned companies will be expected to set profit maximisation as their primary aim; a 
self-managed firm instead will likely act in the pursuit of the welfare of its members; a social 
enterprise is awaited to act for the achievement of a particular welfare, cultural, or 
environmental objective. We use social preferences regarding governance as an indication of 
the decision-makers pre-commitment towards enquiry and inclusion. The second aspect of 
production choices regards other aims and strategies, typically marking internal practices and 
incentives, investment decisions, inter-firm coordination5, industrial relations, community 
involvement, and consumer policy.  
Both types of strategic choices, at different levels, incorporate the attitude of decision-makers 
towards “others” and society at large. Strategic decision-making mechanisms that reflect 
inclusive social preferences would be designed so that situations can be problematized, and 
not just regarding a restricted group’s private concerns. The aim would be to define rules and 
practices that allow the search and inclusion of the publics and their perspectives, as well as 
                                                 
5
 Social preferences concerning strategies subsume also the nature of network relationships amongst firms, 
encompassing governance beyond the legal boundaries of the organisation (Buckley and Carter, 1996; 
Cowling and Sugden, 1994; Hodgson, 2002). Networks are a particularly fertile terrain for the analysis 
of social preferences in decision-making, as the characteristics and implications of the organisation of 
inter-firm linkages are typically identifiable through an analysis of subcontracting relationships and 
collaborative agreements (Markusen, 1996; Parrilli and Sacchetti, 2008; Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003). 
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considerations of the wider common good (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2011). Close to this ideal 
are organisations created with the core social aim of providing welfare, cultural or 
environmental services through multi-stakeholder governance (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012; 
Tortia, 2010). Conversely, exclusive social preferences would not, as a norm, support the 
inclusion of other perspectives and interests rather than those of the decision-makers 
themselves. On this extreme we find for example traditional equity-based corporations with 
no or limited strategy towards stakeholder involvement. 
If we bring together social preferences regarding formal governance structures with those 
about other strategic decision-making processes, we obtain the following hypothetical 
combinations.             
Figure 1: Social preferences in organisational choices 
 
 
 
Social  Preferences on Strategy  
Making 
Inclusive 
Exclusive  
Inclusive 
Exclusive  
Social  Preferences on 
Governance Structure 
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The combination of social preferences regarding governance and those regarding strategy-
making highlights situations of homogeneous preferences, as in cells one and four; as well as 
combinations of heterogeneous preferences, as in cells two and three. In cell one, the initial 
inclusive social preferences supporting the choice of governance, exemplified, for example, 
by membership in self-managed firms, are consistently carried forward to include the 
strategies towards other publics, operating within (e.g. volunteers, salaried workers) and 
outside the organisation (e.g. suppliers or other actors in the civil society, such as users, 
costumers, the public administration, or other interested actors depending on the mission). 
This is often the case for particular forms of social enterprises characterised by both 
mutualistic nature and multi-stakeholder governance (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2013). The crucial 
difference with socially responsible conventional business (cell 3) is that conventional 
business fundamentally retains an exclusive governance structure centred around investor 
interests, even in the presence of corporate social responsibility, whilst alternative business 
forms such as self-managed firms with social aims have embedded, in principle, ideas of 
shared decision-making power and multi-stakeholder benefit in their aims and governance 
structure.  
In cell four, we find quite the opposite, with a consistent persistence of exclusive social 
preferences, both in the initial choice of governance and in the strategic decision-making 
approach. 
In cell two we find organizations, such as cooperative firms, which show inclusive social 
preferences at least towards one major stakeholder. This is typically not the investor but the 
weakest stakeholder. Inclusive preferences, however, do not go beyond membership. Albeit 
founded on democratic governance principles, these cooperatives are mainly accountable to 
their members and do not implement particular practices for the inclusion of other types of 
impacts. An exclusive focus on membership would be consistent with the neo-institutionalist 
18 
 
analysis of cooperatives, which grounds the emergence of cooperative governance in the need 
for particular publics (such as workers, consumers, users, producers) to minimize transaction 
costs when market failure is present (Hansmann, 2000).  
In cell three we may find conventional investor-owned firms engaging in genuine strategies 
for the search and inclusion of publics. We can position here also social enterprises and non-
profit organisations in general (such as private foundations) with a board of managers that is 
strongly driven by the initial social mission, but with no membership.      
 
6. Evolution 
Our taxonomy depicts four representative situations. It is a static picture of ideal-typical  
features of organisations at any given time. But how do firms move from one cell to the 
other? Or, what elements can be expected to lead to the development of more or less inclusive 
patterns of behaviour amongst decision makers? The contradiction that we are left to explain 
is why, despite the fact that inclusive social dispositions improve understanding and validity 
of choices, the reality of production organisation is widely characterised by exclusion 
(Sacchetti et al. 2009).  
There must be, then, a cumulative cycle which perpetuates one type of approach. The 
problem does not lay perhaps in the absence of subjective dispositions towards inclusion, but 
in the institutional bias which does not favour the expression of such preferences. The body 
of research developed by institutional economists offers a number of perspectives on the 
persistence of established patterns. Path-dependence and institutional inertia can reinforce 
false believes, limiting or slowing down the opportunities for change, even when more 
socially or economically efficient alternatives are available or when individuals show 
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different social preferences vis à vis those embedded in existing governance structures 
(Mahoney, 2000).  
A complementary explanation can be found in the complexity of inclusion and enquiry, or the 
fact that coordination by means of exclusive organisational structures can be more immediate 
than those requiring cooperation,6  and can be easier to implement, in terms of time, costs, 
constitutional work, process design, creation of deliberative skills. For example, the 
formation of socially inclusive habits of behaviour has been associated with complex courses 
of value transmission through socialisation (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998), where potential 
obstacles may come from community size and actors’ distance (Dixit, 2009). 
Despite these difficulties, a number of experiences show that socially inclusive institutions 
can be more resilient to the cyclicality of economies and to complexity (Birchall and 
Ketilson, 2009; Ostrom and Basurto, 2010). This was the case also when self-management 
was initiated by individual innovators, prompting social recognition and diffusion by 
imitation. Experiences indicate that radical changes in the organisation of production 
activities were introduced as a highly reasoned and structured reply to the contradictions and 
the problems observed in the environment. The founder of worker cooperatives such as, 
amongst others, father Jose Maria Arizmendiarreta creator of Mondragon in the Bask 
countries is perhaps the most followed and celebrated example, but certainly not the only one. 
Employee buyouts were pioneered, in the 1920s UK, by John Spedan Lewis in the retail 
sector. More recently, in the 1980s, David Erdal led the transition to employee ownership of 
the family papermill Tullis Russell (Erdal, 2011). What the stories of these transitions seem to 
point at is that the distance between the prevailing customs and habits of thinking and the 
                                                 
6
 Coordination, differently from cooperation, can take different paradigmatic forms, market and hierarchy, as 
well as a number of intermediate arrangements which link actors through “strong and weak ties” 
(Granovetter, 1973; Sacchetti and Sugden, 2009). Cooperation however is not implicit in any 
coordination arrangement, as it happens only when actors can reciprocate each other (Gintis et al. 
2005). 
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needs perceived by the innovator has led to a critical consideration of alternative means and 
ends. Innovators had to think about new rules, new governance settings that could address a 
failure of business to meet worker needs. They did so mostly by supporting the achievement 
of inclusive democratic work environments. The complex constitutional settings that 
innovators elaborated expressed dispositions that were in stark opposition with the corporate 
governance and work policies of the 1920s and 80s. With their resilience and growth, these 
companies showed that alternative ways were possible, provided that a careful 
reconsideration of institutional settings were done.  
Still, we would argue that the role played by individual choice does not rule out the relevance 
of the context. In this sense, the entrepreneur’s choice can be considered as a reply to 
historical contextual conditions, whilst at the same time remaining central to the introduction 
of governance innovations and their diffusion. With Dewey (1922), we would say that 
individual decisions are connected with both subjective dispositions and objective conditions, 
that the history or experience of each individual is built around the critical interaction of the 
individual with the context. For John Spedan Lewis experience meant to observe the uneven 
distribution of wealth in the family company and having the possibility to reflect upon it 
because of a long illness. It is because of such historical circumstances and because of his 
critical appreciation of his own and the workers’ needs, that decisions could depart from 
existing habits of thinking and become more closely dependent on individual dispositions. 
  
6.1 Policy action and inclusive social preferences 
The diffusion of governance innovations has generated minority patterns of inclusive 
governance, coexisting with conventional business forms.  Policy has in some cases 
supported diffusion by introducing appropriate legal frameworks. Less so perhaps by 
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promoting awareness of alternatives and, more generally, the generation of deliberative skills 
through education and training which, especially in business education, is subject to the 
strategic choices of higher education institutions (Sugden, 2013). Academia has also been 
argued to have a specific policy role in selecting and weighting beliefs. Within economics and 
business, in particular, the discipline has historically exerted strong influence on economic 
policies as well as in shaping the nature of businesses and their strategies (Currie et al., 2010; 
Fleckenstein, 1997).   
Awareness of alternative ways of organising production, especially in the presence of habits 
of thought and organisational inertia, can be directly promoted also by policies that channel 
the commitment of production organisations towards particular sets of strategies. Here 
commitment entails the possibility of stringent adherence to collectively defined rules which 
may require contractual solutions or radical governance changes (Sacconi, 2011).7  As an 
exemplification of gradual movements from cell 4 towards cell 3 by means of pre-
commitment, consider the recent introduction, in the UK, of the community benefit clause in 
public procurement (CBC). CBCs essentially require contractors to deliver social value added 
to communities (Sacchetti, Campbell, Simmons, 2012). These clauses are generally meant to 
maximise local social welfare generated by public demand, e.g. for infrastructures or specific 
services, e.g. employability services. Specifically, policies at local and regional level in the 
UK have identified the production of value added with respect to employment, training and 
urban regeneration. The criteria set by public administrations aim at delivering wider social 
benefits than those associated exclusively with the provision of a particular good or service. 
For example, CBCs may require, directly or indirectly, contracting out activities to social 
enterprises. In this way, the conventional business firm commits (at least within the remit of 
                                                 
7
 The perspective is different from stakeholder theory, where the inclusion of stakeholder interests is typically 
presented in the context of win-win situations that emerge spontaneously and despite a conventional 
governance structure. 
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the procurement contract) to the implementation of some inclusive social strategies, clearly 
encouraged by the institutional framework defined by CBCs.  
Moreover, when a conventional for-profit company commits to the production of community 
benefits, stakeholders’ expectations towards the inclusion of wider public interests may 
change beyond the remit of the initial commitment contract and become a permanent feature 
of the aims and processes of organisations (Sacconi et al. 2011). As a consequence of 
renewed stakeholder expectations and of the learning generated through engagement with 
social enterprises, organisations may further adjust their governance and/or strategies.  
Specifically the evolution of social preferences towards inclusion would occur when 
conventional businesses and social enterprises enter a reciprocal learning process which may 
prompt a change of strategic aims and processes beyond and consistently with the remit of 
CBCs (Sacchetti, Campbell, Simmons, 2012). 
  
6.2 Institutions matter: historical circumstances and prevailing values  
Albeit representing in general the expression of a niche business culture, since the end of 
WWII8, in some areas of Europe cooperation has grown. Countries like Spain and Italy, for 
example, have a long-standing and stable tradition in self-management.9 In Italy, as Zamagni 
(2006) observes, ideas of human dignity, fairness and solidarity across a variety of political 
orientations (liberal, socialist and catholic) ensured support across local administrations and 
contributed (together with other elements, such as the solidarity and ties amongst 
                                                 
8
 In Italy, after 1924, during fascism, and until the end of the war, all civic and economic associations had been 
forbidden by law, thus putting a halt to the diffusion of cooperatives.  
9
 Over the last thirty years, in Italy cooperation entered a clear growing pattern. In 2001 cooperative firms 
represented 1.2 % of firms counting for about 6 % of the total employment (ISTAT, 2008). Using 
national census data Zamagni (2006) observes that during 1990-2000 the overall occupation grew by 
60.1 % within cooperatives, contributing to one fourth of the overall occupational growth for the 
decade. 
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cooperatives formally coordinated through federations and consortia) to the continuity over 
time of the cooperative business form. This process was supported by the recognition in the 
1948 Italian Constitution of the role of cooperatives10, and in the implementation of this 
principle through consistent legislation and fiscal incentives (Zamagni 2006).  
Specifically (besides manufacturing, financial services and retailing) cooperation has 
prevailed in the provision of social services, 11 where Southern European countries were 
lacking adequate government provision. During the 1970s social cooperation was supported 
as one way of delivering services for which there was demand but lack of supply, provide job 
opportunities against increasing unemployment, and avoid further expansion of public 
spending (Borzaga, 2004; Defourny and Nyssens, 2010).12 The establishment of social 
cooperatives, in particular, was facilitated by the legal framework provided by cooperative 
firms and then formally recognised by specific regulation. The first specific law on social 
enterprises appeared in Italy in 199113, together with a supporting regional and national 
system composed of intermediate cooperative associations, academic research and education, 
professional training, and data collection. In 1994, Issan, an international research and policy 
network on cooperative and social enterprises later named Euricse, was created in 
collaboration with the cooperatives federation, the representative association for commerce 
and toursim and the Faculty of Economics at the Univeristy of Trento. Membership was later 
extended to ensure the development of the initiative and gain international visibility.  The 
institutional recognition of cooperative models was strengthened further in 1997 when the 
Third Sector National Forum is officially instituted and recognized by the government as 
                                                 
10
 Article 45 states: “The Republic recognises the social function of co-operation of a mutualistic, non-
speculative nature. The law promotes and encourages co-operation through appropriate means and 
ensures its character and purposes through adequate controls…” 
11
 Today, there are nearly 14,000 social cooperatives involving 350,000 workers, 35,000 volunteers and 
reaching 4.5 million users (ISTAT, 2008; Carini et al. 2012). 
12
 Since the 1970s social enterprises grew at annual rates between 10 % and 20 % (Borzaga, 2004). 
13
 In the Trentino region, where cooperation has a longstanding tradition, national legislation was anticipated by 
a regional law in 1989. 
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representative of the sector’s interests, and in 1999 when sectorial data started to be collected 
in periodic census by the national statistical institute, ISTAT. The emergence of a network of 
supporting institutions and initiatives seems to suggest that the development of cooperative 
governance and aims, coexisting with traditional ones, has been a viable but demanding 
challenge, which required – as institutional theories suggest – individual initiative together 
with a co-evolution of habits, legal framework, production structure, and supportive 
institutions (Nelson, 1994; Sacchetti, 2004). 
The family nature of local capitalism and the prevalence of small and medium enterprises 
have also been argued to have left more space for the development of alternative business 
forms if compared to systems dominated by large equity-based corporations, such as the UK 
(Zamagni, 2006). Here, in the late 1970s, a neo-liberal approach to policy and economic 
choices, paired by the economic weaknesses, strategic mistakes, and experience of member 
opportunism in collectively-managed organisations brought to the privatisations and 
demutualisation of most of the existing building societies as well as of other mutuals 
(Birchall, 2001).14 
Demutualisation and internal governance problems, clearly illustrate movements from the 
expression, at least in principle, of inclusive social preferences towards the membership (as in 
cells 1 and 2), to conventional business forms (as in cells 3 and 4). More generally, transitions 
to exclusive social preferences are favoured by strategic choices that are not aligned with the 
underpinning principles reflected in cooperative governance settings or with the pursuit of 
long-term member benefits. Demutualisation is in fact more likely to occur in the presence of 
mismanagement, or when the management injects the aims and practices of conventional 
                                                 
14 Differently from the UK, in some countries demutualisation is not an option. If it were, as the UK case 
shows, opportunistic behaviors of members or managers would be incentivised. In fact, because 
cooperatives accumulate indivisible reserves over time, selling an established cooperative permits 
members to appropriate all the value accumulated by previous members, placing the continuity of 
cooperative firms in jeopardy. 
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profit-maximising firms into cooperatives. For example, aggressive growth strategies 
commonly decrease competitiveness and lower the morale of members, who can disengage 
from the idea of shared ownership and responsibility.    
 
7. Conclusions and implications 
The persistence of strategic failure, i.e. the misalignment between the interests of restricted 
groups and those of publics and society at large, has provided socio-economic relevance to 
our study. We have argued that a reduction of strategic failure can occur by reinstating 
enquiry and inclusion in production governance and processes. This would require 
cooperation rather than mere coordination, as in terms of shared access to decision-making 
and use of deliberation. These dispositions, at least in principle, are likely to be present in the 
governance settings of self-managed organisations (but also, to a more limited extent, in 
conventional firms, albeit confined to specific responsible practices).  
More generally the rules that define governance and strategic decision-making processes 
mark the type of decision-makers’ pre-commitment to inclusive deliberative processes and 
enquiry. Some arrangements will acknowledge a variety of interests into the initial 
constitutional process, such as organisations with multi-stakeholder governance; others will 
focus on some interests in particular. Our taxonomy identifies and classifies production 
organisations with respect to their potential to generate strategic failure or, in other words, by 
the degree of exclusion of publics and social good from decision-making.  
We have argued that the evolution of the means and aims of production from exclusion to 
inclusion or viceversa occurs through the interaction between decision-makers’ dispositions 
and contextual, historical conditions. In our examples, individual history and experience have 
had a clear role in shaping preferences towards inclusion, even against the prevailing culture. 
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The implementation of particular social dispositions is, however, not only a matter of 
personal intention but also of historical circumstances and institutional framework. In 
particular, inclusive governance choices are more likely to spread when policy provides 
adequate incentives or when an enabling legal framework is designed. In line with 
institutional explanations, variations can only be understood as co-variations, when change 
occurs at different levels, involving individual dispositions and habits of thought, economic 
organisations and their governance structures, production systems and supporting institutional 
frameworks.   
The role of policy and regulation, therefore, is not understood as constraining, but in fact as 
enabling particular types of behaviours and impacts which would otherwise be marginalised 
because of an institutional vacuum (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2010). Policy may not, and probably 
should not, try to change habits directly. Rather it may change it indirectly “by modifying 
conditions, by an intelligent selecting and weighting of the objects which engage attention 
and which influence the fulfilment of desires” (Dewey, 1922, p. 26). In these respects, the 
challenge for the decision-makers at firm and policy level appears to be one of endowing 
individuals and their organisations with a variety of tools, including those that promote 
engagement in deliberative cooperative processes, so that the knowledge of contexts, courses 
of action, and effects is improved and used to critically assess production aims and means. In 
line with Offe (2011), this requires that decision-making power is shared across social actors, 
deliberately acting to reduce strategic failure.  
As part of its potential, the social preference framework can be used to assess the degree of 
inclusion of publics and wider social values into economic decisions. It may represent also a 
viable explanatory model to assess the impacts of policy action, in terms of variations across 
governance categories. The inclusive/exclusive nature of production systems can be related 
with other socio-economic development measures to test what type of production systems are  
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associated with higher levels of individual wellbeing (Erdal, 2011; Wilkinson and Pricket, 
2010). Beyond private firms, the framework could be applied also to governmental 
organisations. Decision-makers in the public government arena develop different views of the 
world and adopt, not less than others, diverse behaviours with respect to the inclusion of 
publics and social interests. For example, the framework can help clarify aspects of social 
preferences as reflected in the analysis of the aims and outcomes of industrial policy 
(Cowling and Tomlinson, 2011; Chang, 1997), social policy,8 in the processes characterising 
regulatory arenas (Hancher and Moran, 1989), and more generally in practices of problem 
solving in public policy dilemmas (Avio, 2002).  
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